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Anthropologists have long been troubled by belief. Perhaps the best illustration of 
their uneasiness is the opening page of Rodney Needham’s (1972) Belief, language and 
experience, where the author recounts how he once dreamt that he was trying to converse 
with his Penan informants, but was dragged from his sleep by the failure to compose 
the following sentence: ‘I believe in God’. Once fully awake, Needham concluded 
that it was actually impossible to translate this English proposition into Penan. This 
realization not only undermined his own habitual attribution of belief to the Penan 
(e.g., they believe in a supreme God, they believe that their God has certain features 
and possesses certain powers) but, more generally, triggered his suspicion towards 
anthropologists’ confident attribution of belief to the various people they work with 
and motivated his elaborate study into the nature of belief.
Needham’s investigation was self-consciously philosophical, and this same 
orientation has characterized the debates on rationality and on the interpretation of 
apparently irrational beliefs (e.g., Wilson 1970, Hollis & Lukes 1982). Arguably, the 
very abstract philosophical approach to belief has tended to obscure some important 
facts – for example, that ordinary people are likely to hold inconsistent sets of beliefs 
(Luhrmann 1989, Stringer 1996) – that are in fact highly relevant to the discussion 
of what it takes for anthropologists to attribute belief to others. My priority in this 
paper, therefore, is to investigate belief as an ethnographic phenomenon rather than as 
a philosophical conundrum. This investigation is only a start, but it begins to reveal 
1  This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, UK (Research Fellowship 
R000271254, 2002-05). I wish to thank Maurice Bloch, Dan Sperber, Charles Stafford and Harvey Whitehouse for 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. I am indebted to Paul Harris for his collaboration on this project, to Nicola 
Knight for his assistance in data analysis, and to Sean Epstein for his help in the collection of data in Madagascar. This 
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the complexities that lie hidden under the sort of confident attributions of belief that 
are so common in anthropology and that kept Needham awake.
The ethnographic background
The village of Betania, where I have conducted ethnographic fieldwork on and off 
since the late 1980s, has at present a population of about 1000 people. It lies a few miles 
south of Morondava, the main town in the area, which hosts governmental offices, a 
market, a hospital, a post office, and an airport. The livelihood of the village depends on a 
variety of fishing activities, and on the trading of fish at the Morondava market. Typically, 
men go out fishing daily with their dugout canoes and, daily, women sell the catch. With 
what they earn, women buy rice, the staple food, other essential foodstuff and a variety of 
luxury items. The development of tourism in recent years has made Morondava a much 
busier place than it was in the 1980s. This has created a new outlet for the fish caught 
by Betania fishermen, in addition to generating employment opportunities for some of 
the villagers. Nonetheless, most villagers still regard fishing as their most profitable, if 
erratic, source of livelihood, and for this reason, like other people who live on the coast 
and ‘‘struggle with the sea,’’ they call themselves Vezo (see Astuti 1995a, 1995b).
Some of the resources that Vezo villagers earn from their skilful struggle with the 
sea are used to finance the work that living people perform for their dead relatives, 
such as the construction of family tombs and the erection of individual crosses that 
bear the name of the deceased (see Astuti 1994, 1995a). The work is a service that the 
living perform for the dead, but is not a service of a voluntary nature for if the living 
fail to provide the dead with decent “houses” or if they fail to honour them by erecting 
crosses, the dead can make one or more of their descendants ill or even take their life.
The demanding work that the living periodically perform for the dead is only one of 
the contexts in which Vezo villagers interact with their dead relatives. Many events in 
the productive, reproductive and social life of any Vezo family require that the dead be 
promptly informed, for example if one intends to move to a temporary fishing location, 
if one is moving into a newly built house or is launching a new canoe, if one is having 
a difficult birth or if a newborn is brought out of the house for the first time, if one 
is about to sit a school exam, if difficult words have been spoken which make people’s 
heart heavy with anger, if the visiting anthropologist arrives or leaves, and so on. It is 
the responsibility of the senior head of the family (hazomanga, see Astuti 1995a) to call 
the dead and talk to them, asking for their protection or their forgiveness, and ensuring 
that they are kept well informed of life’s events – for whenever the dead have reasons to 
be “surprised,” they will want to ask questions, thereby causing trouble for the living.
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The dead communicate with their living descendants through the dreams that 
they induce in them. This is because when a person dies, the breathing stops, the body 
becomes stiff, cold and soon begins to stink and to decompose. But when a person dies, 
the ‘spirit’ – known as fanahy up to the moment of death – permanently departs from 
the body. In its new disembodied, ghostly form, the spirit – now known as angatse – 
is invisible (tsy hita maso), and moves around like wind (tsioky). To be seen by living 
people, it enters their dreams, where it appears together with its original uncorrupted 
body, just as it was when the person was alive.2
In a sense, it is somewhat misleading to say that the spirit of the dead enters the 
dreams of the living, since these dreams are more like encounters between fellow spirits. 
During sleep, the fanahy of living people temporarily detaches itself from the body and 
wanders until waking time.3 If one’s fanahy travels to market, one dreams about the 
market; if it travels to sea, one dreams about the sea; if it is approached by the angatse 
of a dead relative, one dreams of that relative. Most of one’s fanahy’s nocturnal activities 
reflect one’s preoccupations during the day and especially one’s thoughts just before fall-
ing into deep sleep. However, the encounters with angatse of dead people are different 
because they are originated by the will of the dead, rather than by the thoughts of the 
living. In this sense, angatse can indeed be said to force their way into the dreams of the 
living, in a way that is perhaps not so dissimilar from the more dramatic and complex 
forms of spiritual intrusion that go under the name of spirit possession. 
Dreams about one’s dead relatives must be promptly recounted to members of 
one’s immediate family and to the senior person who has the authority to call upon the 
particular individual who appeared in the dream. The meaning of some of these dreams 
is plain and straightforward: the dead person complains that she is hungry because her 
[living] son cannot be bothered to buy food for her, or she says that she feels cold because 
her house (i.e., the tomb) is falling apart; she might herself offer food to the dreamer 
or put her cold hand on the dreamer’s forehead. All of these are bad, dangerous dreams, 
which have immediate effect on the dreamer (a fever, an ear-ache, some swelling), and 
which require immediate action (an offering of rice or even the slaughtering of a head 
of cattle) to appease the offended spirit. But dreams can be more ambiguous (e.g., the 
deceased simply appears, staring, but does not say anything) and may prompt no imme-
2  When people recount their nocturnal encounters with angatse, they place great emphasis on the fact that 
they see the deceased and on the fact that the deceased appears exactly like s/he was before s/he died. 
3  Because of the spirit’s departure from the body during sleep, being asleep is like being dead (olo matory 
naman’ ny olo maty, literally, people who are asleep are dead people’s friends). Several adult informants told me that if 
a person’s face is smeared with tabake (a yellow paste derived from medicinal woods) while she is asleep, the spirit will 
be unable to recognize the body it belongs to and will fail to reconnect with it, leading to that person’s death.
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diate action, until an illness calls for an explanation and the dream is promptly remem-
bered and reinterpreted. In some cases – typically when children are involved – dreams 
are only revealed through divination. Given their lack of wisdom and understanding, 
children are not expected to recognize the significance of dreams, nor are they expected to 
remember or to recount them. But if children get ill and their illness persists and defies 
treatment with western medicines, parents will approach a diviner who will be able to 
see that the child had a dream in which the angatse of a certain dead relative touched her 
forehead or gave her food; an explanation will also be offered as to why the dead relative 
is angry – her children have forgotten her and they fight all the time, she feels lonely, she 
is “surprised” by a new residential arrangement she has not been informed of – and what 
actions must be taken to appease the angatse and restore the child’s health.
This brief account of the interactions between Vezo villagers and their dead relatives 
is based on my observation of several “works” performed for the dead and on numerous 
instances when elderly hazomanga addressed invisible interlocutors, offered them cooked 
rice, tobacco, rum, or (more exceptionally) slaughtered a cow and offered bits of cooked 
meat. It is based on the reports and the interpretations of dreams involving dead relatives, 
and on the course of action that followed. It is based on diviners’ diagnoses of unabating 
illnesses and on people’s speculations as to why a healthy child suddenly died or a strong 
young man drowned at sea. And it is based on several conversations with my closest Vezo 
friends who, over the years, have helped me understand what was going on around me. 
All of these sources appear to deliver one clear message: that Vezo believe that a 
deceased person’s angatse continues to want, to feel cold, hungry, lonely or outright 
angry, and continues to monitor, judge and influence living people – in other words, 
that some of the person’s sensory, cognitive and emotional (mental for short) faculties 
survive after death. Although this attribution of belief sounds like a plausible infer-
ence, common enough in anthropological interpretative practice, the experimental 
evidence I present next will call for some significant qualifications. Before I start, 
though, some terminological clarifications are in order.
What works and what doesn’t
In his remarks on the verb “to believe,” Pouillon (1982: 6) points out that “it is 
not so much the believer who affirms his belief as such, it is rather the unbeliever who 
reduces to mere believing what, for the believer, is more like knowing.” When one 
says that, for example, the Dangaleat believe in the existence of their local spirits, it 
is because one does not believe that these spirits exist, and one assumes that to do so 
requires a special disposition, i.e., belief. These observations come with the proviso 
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that in the case of Christian believers, for historical and ontological reasons, the believ-
ers themselves cannot avoid expressing their belief in the existence of God (see also 
Ruel, 1982). Christians, therefore, most definitively believe in God. But, Pouillon 
asks (1982: 4), how can one tell whether Dangaleat believe in local spirits and in what 
way? What questions can one ask them, using what word in their language, in what 
context? 
I am well aware that the same riddles apply to the Vezo. How can I tell whether 
the Vezo believe that the angatse survives after death or whether they just know it? 
How can I ask them? To address precisely this kind of questions, Bloch (2002) has 
turned to historical evidence from 19th century Highland Madagascar. He asks: What 
happened when Christian missionaries set out to convert the Malagasy? Which beliefs 
did they identify in Malagasy religion? Which beliefs were they able to eradicate? He 
notes: the missionaries – unquestionably experts in identifying Christian-like beliefs 
– targeted and successfully eradicated the “belief” in cult objects known as sampy, but 
they ignored the “belief” in the continuing existence of dead forebears, so that people’s 
relations with the ancestors were not affected by conversion to Christianity. From this 
observation, Bloch concludes that for the Malagasy ancestors are not an object of belief 
in the Christian sense, for had they been so, they would have certainly been targeted 
by the missionaries.
Though convincing, Bloch’s analysis leaves us with a negative conclusion: that the 
way Malagasy “believe” in the existence of their dead forebears is different from the 
way Christians “believe” in the existence of God. But it provides us with little evidence 
of how Malagasy do in fact represent to themselves the existence of their dead fore-
bears. My intention in this paper is to begin to provide some of this evidence. But to 
be able to do this, I need to make the following stipulation: that I use the word belief 
in the simple sense of “holding something to be true.” I shall take as evidence that 
people hold something to be true the fact that they use it is as a basis for novel infer-
ences. For example, evidence that people believe that after death the body decomposes 
but the angatse survives can be found in the novel inferences they are prepared to make 
about which of a person’s properties remain viable after death. From this perspective, 
whether Vezo believe in the survival of the angatse becomes a question that can be 
investigated empirically.
The experimental tool I have used to carry out this investigation was originally 
designed by developmental psychologists Paul Harris and Marta Giménez (2005) to 
study Spanish children’s understanding of death and the afterlife. In the first instance, 
I used it to interview 23 Vezo men and women, aged between 19 and 62 years (mean 
= 33 years). I first asked them to listen to a short narrative about a fictional character 
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called Rampy. They were told that Rampy was a very hard working man, who one 
day fell ill with high fever and was taken to the hospital by his wife and children. The 
doctor gave him four injections, but after three days he died. Participants were then 
asked a set of 14 questions, half of which were about the continued functioning of some 
of Rampy’s body parts and bodily processes (e.g., now that Rampy is dead, do his eyes 
work? does his heart beat?), and the other half were about the continued viability of 
some of his sensory, emotional and cognitive functions (e.g., now that Rampy is dead, 
does he hear people talk? does he miss his children? does he know his wife’s name?).4 
For want of a better, more intuitive phrase (such as the statement often heard during 
Vezo funerals: “when one is dead, one is dead!”), in what follows I shall refer to partici-
pants’ negative answers  (e.g., Rampy’s eyes do not work or Rampy does not hear people 
talk) as discontinuity judgements: judgments that state that life and death are discontinuous, 
that what works in life no longer works in death, that what was felt in life is no longer 
felt in death, and so on. By contrast, I shall refer to participants’ affirmative answers 
(e.g., Rampy’s ears work or Rampy knows his wife’s name) as continuity judgments: judg-
ments that state that life and death are continuous, that what works in life continues to 
work in death, that what was felt in life continues to be felt in death, and so on. 
On the basis of the ethnographic evidence reported above, one would expect 
participants to judge that Rampy’s bodily processes come to an end when he dies and 
that at least some of his sensory, emotional and cognitive functions remain viable, since 
these are the properties routinely attributed to the surviving angatse (as when people 
worry that their dead relatives might be feeling cold or that they will soon demand 
to hear the latest news). As expected, participants differentiated between bodily and 
mental processes: on average, they gave a smaller number of discontinuity judgments 
for mental than for bodily processes. However, the most striking finding was that just 
under half of the participants gave discontinuity judgments for all the mental processes 
they were questioned about. They reasoned, in other words, that death extinguishes 
the person and they made no room in their reasoning for the survival of the angatse.5  
In view of this result, we can begin to qualify the conclusion reached above that 
Vezo believe that a person’s mental faculties survive after death. As measured by my 
4  The complete list of properties was as follows: BODILY: Do his eyes work? Do his ear work? Does his stom-
ach need food? Does his heart beat? Do his legs move? Does a cut on his hand heal? Does he age? MENTAL: does he 
see things around? Does he hear people’s talk? Does he feel hungry? Does he know his wife’s name? Does he remember 
where his house is? Does he feel cold? Does he miss his children? Participants were asked each set of 7 questions in one 
of two random orders. Half the participants received the bodily questions followed by the mental questions and half 
received the reverse order.
5  Statistical analyses of the data presented here can be found in Astuti & Harris, in preparation.
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informants’ judgments about the fate of Rampy, this belief is clearly present, but its 
spread is far from universal. As I show next, however, this first qualification does not 
go far enough. 
To someone who has lived in Betania for extended periods of time and has seen 
people save significant sums of money to finance the construction of tombs and crosses 
that were meant to appease the anger of their dead relatives, and who has witnessed 
numerous monologues directed at a recently dead grandmother, at a long dead father 
or at long forgotten forebears, the fact that nearly half of the participants in the death 
interview failed to attribute any mental properties to the deceased is puzzling. In some 
cases, I knew for a fact that the people who emphatically stated that Rampy would 
be rotting under the ground with no possibility of seeing, hearing, feeling, knowing 
or thinking because his head would be filling up with worms, had encountered the 
angatse of a dead relative in a dream, which had prompted an offering of rice to the 
deceased, or had sponsored the repairs to the family tomb, following a sudden spread 
of illness in the family. 
Many anthropologists might want to argue that the puzzling outcome of the death 
interview is an artifice of an inappropriate experimental tool which forces informants 
to give stark yes/no answers about a fictional character they do not know and cannot 
relate to in meaningful ways. Before embracing this line of argument, however, I shall 
explore a different possibility, which is motivated by the hypothesis that people will 
bring to mind the belief that a person’s mental properties survive after death when 
the belief becomes contextually relevant. From this perspective, the reason so many 
participants took such a radical annihilating stance towards Rampy is not that the 
task was in itself ecologically unsound, but that its narrative context did not make the 
representations of the survival of Rampy’s mental properties relevant to them.
This hypothesis generates a straightforward empirical question: can a manipula-
tion in the way the task is designed – specifically, a change of the narrative context in 
which the questions are asked – change the distribution of participants’ discontinuity 
judgments? To pursue this question, I recruited a new group of 23 Vezo adults aged 
between 19 and 71 years (mean = 35 years) and asked them to listen to a different 
narrative about a different fictional character called Rapeto. They heard that Rapeto 
had lots of children and grandchildren who, on the day he died, were with him inside 
his house. Now that he is dead, his children and grandchildren often dream about him. 
Rapeto’s family has built the cement cross for him, and they are happy because the 
work was well accomplished. The questions about Rapeto were identical to those about 
Rampy, but instead of being introduced by the statement that Rampy is now dead, 
they were introduced by the statement that Rapeto is now over at the tombs.
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Of course, whatever difference we might find between the participants who heard 
the Rampy narrative (from now on referred to as the Corpse narrative) and those who 
heard the Rapeto narrative (from now on referred to as the Tomb narrative) could be 
caused by a cohort effect. Given the many variables that could potentially affect the 
way people reason in the task (including, perhaps, how recently they lost a close rela-
tive or have had a vivid dream about a dead relation), it is clearly impossible to control 
for everything. However, in recruiting participants, efforts were made to control for 
age, gender, education, and church attendance, making sure that the profile of the 
participants in the Corpse and Tomb conditions were as far as possible matched. 
Therefore, although it is impossible to entirely rule out a cohort effect, it is reasonable 
to suggest that if participants in the Tomb condition are found to respond differently 
from those in the Corpse condition, this is because of the different narrative contexts 
they were presented with.
We can think of the new Tomb narrative as a form of priming, intended to bring to 
the attention of the participants the ritual contexts in which the representations of the 
deceased’s enduring mental properties are likely to be most relevant.6 As it happens, 
the priming proved remarkably effective in that participants in the Tomb condition 
were less likely to give discontinuity judgments than their counterparts in the Corpse 
condition. In particular, the percentage of participants who judged that all mental 
faculties cease at death went down from 43 to 13.
To sum up: the brief evocation of the contexts in which the living work for the 
dead to honour and appease them had the critical effect of strengthening the distribu-
tion of the belief that a person’s mental faculties survive after death. This means that 
Vezo adults are more or less likely to embrace this belief depending on the context that 
gives it relevance. The difference between the responses to the Corpse and the Tomb 
narratives suggest that Vezo adults do not believe that the deceased’s mental faculties 
survive after death in the abstract, but when their attention is on tombs that have to 
be built, on dreams that have to be interpreted, on illnesses that have to be explained 
and resolved. By implication, this finding suggests that, depending on context, Vezo 
can summon up different, even contrary representations of what happens to people 
6  To refer to the Rapeto narrative as a form of priming is not entirely correct because it implies that the 
Rampy narrative does not prime participants. Both narratives are in fact a form of priming in so far as they draw partici-
pants’ attention to different aspects (i.e., organic versus ritual) of the dying process. Nonetheless, the developmental 
data I present below suggest that the understanding of death as the end of both bodily and mental functions emerges 
before the understanding of death as the end of bodily functions and the preservation of mental functions. There are 
thus reasons to believe that the Rampy narrative primes a more intuitive construal of death than the Rapeto narrative, 
and this justifies its use as a baseline to assess the effect of the priming of the Rapeto narrative.
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after death, a point that I have discussed more fully elsewhere (Astuti, 2005) and to 
which I shall return later.
But there is yet another qualification that needs to be made. In both the Corpse 
and the Tomb conditions, the number of discontinuity judgments given by those 
participants who judged that the deceased would retain at least some mental properties 
ranged all the way between 0 (all properties remain viable) and 6 (only one property 
remains viable). This means that there was remarkably little agreement about the exact 
functions that the deceased would retain – for some, it was hearing, for others it was 
knowing one’s wife name and remembering the location of one’s house, for others still 
it was all of the above plus feeling hungry, and so on. 
The overall distribution of participants’ judgments, therefore, not only suggests 
that the belief in the survival of the angatse is deployed contextually, but also that it is 
appropriated by different people to compose very personal and idiosyncratic represen-
tations of what happens after death. This variability in people’s representations of the 
afterlife was even more apparent in the course of the informal conversations that were 
sparked by the death interviews. For example, several people puzzled over the ques-
tion of how exactly the dead manage to eat, drink or smoke what is offered to them. 
Some speculated that the dead feed by inhaling the smell and extracting the flavour 
from the food. Evidence for this is that, as they claimed, the meat that is distributed 
after slaughtering a cow that is being offered to dead people does not taste the same as 
the meat that one buys at the market for family consumption; the first type of meat is 
reportedly tasteless because all its flavour has been consumed by dead people’s feasting 
angaste. Others were more tentative and rather unsure, wondering how dead people 
could possibly eat – since they don’t have a body, they surely don’t have a mouth! 
Maybe, all that happens is that they see the living throwing the morsels of food (which 
are likely to be eaten by passer-by animals) and that is all they care about – to be 
remembered and to be shown respect. The most radical position was that offering food 
or drinks or cigarettes to dead people makes no sense at all: has anybody ever tried to 
stuff food in the mouth of a dead person, or to get a corpse to puff a cigarette? The 
only reason people bother to cook meat and rice and to light the tobacco is that for a 
long, long time this has been the Malagasy way of doing things. In truth, what really 
happens is that the food is eaten by the living and the tobacco just goes to waste. As 
for the dead, well, the dead are just dead.
Apart from the variability in how they made sense of specific aspects of the 
angatse’s existence, people also clearly demonstrated to have very different degrees of 
interest in, and to have reached very different levels of elaboration of, the belief that a 
dead person’s angatse survives after death. Some of my interlocutors were indifferent, 
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even sceptical novices, while others were committed experts. Most strikingly, adults 
differed in the degree of sophistication with which they puzzled over difficult ques-
tions, some of which I brought up and others which they had themselves considered 
and tried to answer: for example, is dreaming about a dead person in any way similar 
to being possessed by a spirit? Can a dead person appear simultaneously in different 
people’s dreams? Can one dream about dead people one has never met? How exactly 
do angaste make people ill? Are dreams a necessary vehicle for their interventions? Are 
there ways of resisting these dreams? Do babies have angatse? Do animals?
Although difficult to quantify, some of this variation had to do with age, with older 
people (aged roughly 40 and above) being predictably more inclined to explain points of 
detail, to recount poignant personal experiences or to speculate about aspects of the rela-
tionship between the living and the dead that they did not fully grasp. When pressed by 
my relentless questioning, they hardly faltered, giving evidence that they had themselves, 
at some point, reflected about the hows and whys, and had come up with their own answers 
(different, perhaps, from those of a brother or a husband I had approached a few hours 
earlier). Younger adults (aged roughly 40 and below) tended to be less interested, to give 
more cursory and standardized answers to my questions, or to dismiss them altogether. 
To illustrate: I never managed to get any of the younger people to seriously engage 
with the question of whether animals have angatse. The almost automatic answer they 
all produced was that they had never heard of anybody being visited in a dream by 
an animal – a patently absurd scenario! Admittedly, not many of the older people had 
much to say either about this topic, apart from pointing out that since animals do not 
talk, it is hard to know what might be going on with them. But in one case, a very old 
man took my question at heart and, having pondered over it in his mind, he suggested 
that if animals have a fanahy – and he guessed that some animals, like whales or 
dolphins, might – then when they die their angatse will probably wander around, 
just like the angatse of dead people. His insight was that the angatse of a dead animal 
is not going to appear in the dream of a human (as implied by the younger people), 
but in the dreams of its own children, whom it will miss very much. He was sure 
that mother-dolphins and mother-whales are capable of feeling something for their 
offspring, because they stubbornly look for them if they get separated. But he conceded 
that we shall never know whether dolphins and whales have dreams! Throughout the 
conversation, I felt that this old man was taking me to a level of understanding of what 
angatse are all about that was not to be matched by anyone else. Perhaps the reason 
for his sophistication is that, being the head (hazomanga) of his ancestral group, he 
dreams about his dead forebears almost every night. Understandably, the issue of what 
it means and what it feels to be an angatse is likely to be on his mind quite a lot.
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There are two points I wish to draw out of these ethnographic observations. The 
first one is that the specific content and degree of elaboration of the belief that some-
thing survives after death varies greatly, between younger and older adults but also 
between one individual and the next. To be meaningful, the attribution to the Vezo 
of the belief in the survival of the angatse must take this variability into account. The 
second, related point is that if people are so inclined – and not everyone is – they can 
easily spend a lifetime trying to understand better and more. Both of these points 
raise the question of how this process of understanding might get started and how it 
might develop. 
Developmental insights
As reviewed by Harris and Giménez (2005), developmental psychologists of 
different theoretical inclinations have had a sustained interest in children’s under-
standing of, and emotional reaction to death. Only recently, however, they have 
began to integrate the study of children’s increasingly sophisticated understand-
ing of death as a biological phenomenon (e.g., Slaughter, Jaakola & Carey, 1999; 
Jaakola & Slaughter, 2002; Slaughter & Lyons, 2003), with the study of children’s 
beliefs in the afterlife (e.g., Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bering, Hernandez-Blasi 
& Bjorklund, 2005; Harris & Giménez, 2005). My investigation of how Vezo 
children come to believe that dead people remain an active presence in their 
lives has been inspired by this new line of research, particularly by Paul Harris’s 
insights into children’s ability to imagine outcomes beyond the realm of possibil-
ity (Harris, 2000).  
As a first exploration into Vezo children’s understanding of the consequences of 
death, I recruited three groups of Vezo children – 18 5-year olds,7 16 7-year olds,8 and 
28 9- to 17-year olds9 – and asked them to take part in the Corpse task. A few changes 
in the basic design were introduced in an attempt to make the procedure as accessible 
7  Mean age = 5 years 9 months; range = 5 years 6 months to 6 years 6 months. I made several attempts 
to work with younger children, aged 4 to 5, using a protocol similar to the one designed by Barrett & Behne (2005), 
which involved acting out the death of a toy-mouse which falls pray to a toy-cat. Unfortunately, I was unable to 
overcome children’s shyness and their remarkable ability to remain silent, even when the questions were asked, in my 
absence, by a Vezo experimenter or by one of the children’s own parents (the main problem, in this case, was that the 
parent had no patience for the child’s “silliness” and prompted them to give the “right” answer).
8  Mean age = 7 years 1 month; range = 6 years 9 months to 7 years 7 months.
9  Mean age = 13 years and 3 months; range = 8 years and 11 months to 17 years and 2 months.
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as possible to the youngest children.10 Irrespective of age, though, all the children were 
asked the same 14 questions about Rampy’s bodily and mental properties that were 
used with adults.
The overall developmental trajectory that can be derived from the distribution of 
children’s answers is as follows: 5-year olds made a random assessment of the conse-
quences of death on either bodily or mental functions, and gave no evidence of under-
standing the consequences of death on either a person’s bodily or mental functions.11 
By the age of 7, children reliably gave more discontinuity than continuity judgments, 
and did so for both bodily and mental functions. Conversely, if they judged that some-
thing survives, they were as likely to do so for bodily as for mental functions. Between 
the age of 9 and 17, children began to entertain the notion that, while the body most 
definitely perishes and rots away, some limited aspects of the deceased’s mental life are 
preserved. This is shown by the fact that they were less likely to give discontinuity 
judgments for mental than for bodily properties. However, when we compare these 
older children with adults, we find that their endorsement of the belief that Rampy’s 
mental life continues after death was somewhat weaker: first, the number of 9- to 
17-year olds who gave only discontinuity judgments for mental properties was larger 
than the number of adults; second, those children who gave some continuity judg-
ments tended to grant Rampy fewer mental properties than adults.12
This developmental progression suggests that the idea that the deceased’s mental 
functions are preserved after death emerges only after children have consolidated their 
10  The 5- and 7-year olds were not told a story but were shown a drawing of a man called Rampy. After 
an initial warm-up session in which they were asked several questions about the drawing (e.g., is Rampy standing or 
sitting, are his trousers red or brown), children were told that Rampy had recently died, and they were shown a new 
drawing of the man lying flat on a bed, with a white cloth tied around his jaw. The 9- to 17-year olds were told the 
same narrative that was used with adults. While the story was narrated, they were shown the same drawings of live 
and dead Rampy that were used with the younger children, as this helped focus their attention.
11  The test questions were randomly interspersed with 5 control questions about factual details in the draw-
ing the children were looking at (e.g., is there a bucket under the bed?) The few children who failed to answer the 
control questions correctly were excluded from the study, as their failure suggested that they were not engaged with 
the task and/or were enable to cope with the test setting. By implication, we can assume that the answers to the test 
questions by those children who correctly answered the control questions reflect a genuine lack of understanding of 
what happens after death.
12  I have compared the test results of 7-year olds, 9- to 17-year olds and adults despite the fact that, as 
explained above, their test conditions were not identical. The reason the comparison remains valid is that all three age 
groups were prompted to focus on Rampy’s dead body, whether by visual or verbal means, or both. The comparison 
would be invalidated if there were reasons to believe that 7-year olds would have given less discontinuity judgments 
for mental properties had they heard the Rampy narrative, or that adults’ judgments would have been affected by the 
presentation of the line drawing of Rampy’s dead body. Both of these eventualities seem highly unlikely.
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biological understanding of the consequences of death: that when a living organism 
dies, the functions that made life possible and that were sustained by life come to an 
abrupt end. Vezo children have at their disposal massive and readily available empirical 
evidence to support the construction of this view of the consequences of death – corpses 
that rot, do not move, do not speak, do not look, do not wake up, and are put away 
under the sand. As graphically put by a 9 years old boy: “the body goes bad, the skin 
is all decomposing and inside the tummy is full of worms …and in the head there are 
all sorts of animals that go inside it, and there is nothing that they [dead people] need 
and they can’t hear anything.” Against this early-emerging assessment of the annihilat-
ing consequences of death, the realization that some sensory, cognitive and emotional 
faculties survive after death appears to grow with age. This finding converges with that 
of Harris and Giménez (2005), and contradicts the claim put forward by Bering and 
his collaborators that young children have a natural disposition to make these attribu-
tions (i.e., to assume that faculties such as feeling, thinking, and knowing continue 
after death), a disposition which weakens with age as children learn to construe death 
as biological process (see Bering & Bjorklund 2004; Bering, Hernández-Blasi & 
Bjorklund, 2005; Bering, in press).13 
Undoubtedly, anthropologists are likely to find it self-evident that Vezo children 
gradually acquire supernatural beliefs about the ancestors. This is because they tend 
to assume that children learn beliefs in magic, spirits, or gods (see Mead 1932 for 
an illustration). However, the developmental data presented here suggest that Vezo 
children successfully acquire supernatural beliefs about the ancestors only once they 
have understood the biological consequences of death. Arguably, children do not need 
to understand that death brings to an end an organism’s vital functions to learn to 
attribute all the relevant mental properties to dead people (e.g., knowing, remember-
ing, feeling nostalgic, etc.) Indeed, ignorance of the biological consequences of death 
could facilitate children’s assimilation of their elders’ representations of the afterlife. 
But the results of this study suggest that Vezo children construct their understanding 
of the properties of the ancestors on their knowledge, not on their ignorance, of the 
biological consequences of death. And this suggests that learning about the ancestors 
is a much more complicated process than anthropologists tend to imagine. In this 
case, it would seem that instead of learning about the ancestors by learning about the 
13  See Harris & Giménez, 2005 and Astuti & Harris, in preparation, for the suggestion that the difference 
in the findings might be due to differences in design, specifically the fact that Harris & Giménez and Astuti & Harris 
use a story that involves the death of a person, whereas Bering and colleagues use a story that involves the death of a 
puppet-mouse.
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ancestors (the standard anthropological model of cultural transmission), children may 
be learning about the ancestors in very unlikely places and at unlikely times, as when 
they play with small animals, pulling a lizard’s leg or squashing a frog’s head, and 
watching their “toys” die. 
Granted that children first understand that death entails annihilation, they will 
eventually grow into the belief that death does not entirely extinguish the person. We 
must therefore ask what drives and sustains this growth.14 If it is true that Vezo chil-
dren have much evidence that supports the realization that death extinguishes every 
aspect of the person, it is equally true that they have plenty of evidence that supports 
the opposite realization that something of the deceased survives after death. Like the 
Kwaio children beautifully described by Keesing (1982: 30-39), it is hard to imagine 
how Vezo children could escape the conclusion that the dead are a wilful and “lively” 
presence among the living, as they witness the monologues that elders direct at dead 
but clearly wanting interlocutors, or they share in the offerings of meat and rice given 
to them, or they suffer the illnesses, enjoy the recoveries or mourn the deaths that are 
caused by this or that angry angatse. 
If this is the kind of evidence that fuels children’s emerging awareness that some-
thing of the person survives after death, we might expect that children, like adults, 
will be more likely to bring to mind the belief that people’s mental functions are not 
entirely extinguished by death when they are invited to think about tombs, crosses 
and the work that the living perform for their dead relatives to keep them happy. 
To explore this possibility, I invited a new group of 28 9- to 17 year olds15 to listen 
to the same Tomb narrative that was used with adults.16 Like adults, the children in 
the Tomb condition gave far less discontinuity judgments than the children in the 
Deceased condition. Thus, when primed to think about tombs and crosses, the major-
ity of children judged that life continues after death. Such a dramatic effect confirms 
that, at least from the age of 9, Vezo children are well attuned with the ritual practices 
that concern the afterlife and that, from these practices, they infer that something of 
the person survives after death.
14  Developmental psychologist Paul Bloom (2004: 207) has argued that “belief in an afterlife is a natural 
consequence of our [i.e., members of the species Homo Sapiens] intuitive Cartesian perspective.” My data do not bear on 
the hypothesis that humans are natural dualists, but they suggest that the conversion of dualism into a belief in the 
afterlife is not automatic and does not come for free. Hence the question of what sustains it and makes it grow.
15  Mean age = 12 years and 11 months; range = 9 years to 17 years and 3 months.
16  Children in the Tomb condition were shown a drawing of live Rapeto and a drawing of his tomb and the 
cross bearing his name.
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Note, however, that the early emerging representation of death as the annihila-
tion of the organism will never be discarded, as revealed by the fact that in the Corpse 
condition older children and adults alike were more likely than in the Tomb condition 
to reason that all comes to a halt when a person dies. In other words, in the course 
of development apparently incompatible representations come to co-exist in people’s 
minds. Such co-existence raises a further question for a future investigation, namely 
whether these representations can be distinguished in terms of the cognitive demands 
that they impose on their users. Following Barrett’s distinction between basic and 
“theologically correct” concepts (1999), or Sperber’s distinction between intuitive and 
reflective beliefs (1997), once could test whether, in a cognitively demanding task 
where people are forced to reason quickly and on-the-fly (for example, a memory task), 
participants might only have access to the earlier, more basic representation of death 
as annihilation. This would indicate that bringing to mind the idea that the angatse of 
dead people survive the rotting of their bodies requires some effort, a certain amount of 
conscious reflection, and the mobilization of one’s “theologically correct” and explicitly 
held reflective beliefs.
Conclusion
My investigation has challenged what at first sight seemed like a reasonable infer-
ence, based on sound ethnographic evidence: that Vezo believe in the survival of the 
angatse. The studies I have undertaken with Vezo adults and children have exposed 
several reasons why this attribution of belief needs to be significantly qualified. First, 
the belief is not held universally; second, the belief that some mental properties of the 
person survive after death is interpreted, understood, and elaborated in a great variety 
of ways by different people. And finally, and most significantly, Vezo believe in the 
survival of the angatse in some contexts and they do not believe in the survival of the 
angatse in other contexts. This does not make their belief in the power of the ancestors 
any less compelling, when it is believed; but it shows that the belief in the power of 
the ancestors is best approached in terms of when and where it is deployed, rather than 
in terms of whether it is held.
Where does this leave the anthropological study of belief? How do we know what 
our informants believe? It has become commonplace for anthropologists to warn about 
the ambiguities of the word ‘belief’ and the cultural specificity of the concept this 
word refers to. Such warnings seem to suggest that we have no way of finding out what 
goes on in the heads of our informants, and that therefore we are better off not trying. 
What I have shown here is that such pessimism is misplaced. The task is arduous and 
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we shall never succeed completely. But we can move forward. Thanks to the studies 
described in this article, I feel we know more about what the Vezo “believe” than we 
did before. I trust that the reader will feel the same.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze beliefs in afterlife among the Vezo of 
Madagascar. This analysis purports to be an empirical investigation by means of a 
combination of ethnography and the experimental methods of developmental psychol-
ogy. The conclusion challenges the unqualified idea that Vezo believe in the survival 
of a person’s spirit after death. Research shows that the belief is not held universally 
and it is interpreted and elaborated in a great variety of ways by different people. In 
addition, Vezo believe in the survival after death of a person’s spirit in some contexts 
but not in others. This does not make belief in the power of the ancestors any less 
compelling, but it shows that such belief is best approached contextually, in terms of 
when and where it is deployed rather than in terms of whether it is held.
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